

## Hwa Yol Jung's Daoist Phenomenology

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### Introduction

Hwa Yol Jung combines phenomenology, hermeneutics, postmodernism and East Asian thought in his work. This article explains crossings of experience between Eastern and Western thinking through Jung's analysis. Special attention goes to Chinese ideograms as sites for the merging of horizons through etymosinology, diatactics and carnal hermeneutics. Etymosinology helps recover the patterns between Chinese language and culture by viewing the ideogram as a kinetic art of the body in motion. The deconstruction of ideograms reveals the architecture of Chinese philosophy and culture. Diatactics involves the logic of correlating several disparate phenomena as complementary. Carnal hermeneutics views the body as a pivot for both theory and practice that stands against Western disembodied reason. Jung harmonizes these theories alongside Jacques Maritain, Martin Heidegger, Roland Barthes, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Giambattista Vico in order to fuse Eastern and Western horizons in the spirit of creating a global citizenship through intertwining existentialism, phenomenology and post-structuralism.

The corpus of Hwa Yol Jung's work is as broad as it is deep. Over a forty year period, his writings encompass philosophy, literature, poetry and political theory on both sides of the Pacific. This article will focus on the interpolation of phenomenology and Asian philosophy in Jung's writings. The works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger have seeped to the very essence of Jung's thinking as have the intricate interlacing of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. Yet, Jung is also able to critique these diverse origins both East and West. The article itself is a strategy for collecting Jung's most intriguing and diverse thoughts by examining the crossings of experience of both Western and Eastern philosophy. From his earlier writings on Confucius and Ezra Pound to his later efforts to create a global political theory, Jung consistently relies on a merging of horizons. Post-structural commentaries help Jung deconstruct some of the barriers to thought both within and between the East/West nexus; phenomenology helps him re-assemble the fragments. Between the parts and the whole, we see a void of in-betweenness where Jung freely navigates. It is this void that allows him to simultaneously appear and disappear in his own texts as he interrogates the split between global and local, subject and object, mind and body, self and other, East and West. His most recent work encapsulates this analysis with the concepts of "transversality" and "trans(uni)versality."

### Jacques Maritain's Existentialism

From the beginning of his scholarly work, Hwa Yol Jung is a border crosser. The entire range of his thinking intimately engages both Eastern and Western thought. The epigraph for his first monograph book *Foundation of Jacques Maritain's Political Philosophy* is from Laozi. It reads: "In my words there is a principle. In the affairs of men, there is a system."<sup>1</sup> In the corpus of his

writing, Jung deconstructs systems in favor of principles, thereby addressing the affairs of humanity rather than the fleeting moments of abstraction. Those principles collect around *dao* 道 the way. In Chinese, *dao* means accordingly direction, way, method, road, path, principle, truth, reason, skill, to say, to speak and to talk. Jung's approach to scholarship is as multi-varied as this elusive word *dao*. It includes approaches to Eastern and Western philosophy, literature, culture and politics to name a few. All of the thinkers than Jung engages with are those themselves willing to cross borders and merge horizons. Maritain, for instance, is a pioneer in existentialism who connects politics, philosophy, ethics and theology. Jung writes:

In the hierarchy of practical knowledge we are directly concerned with knowledge for the sake of *acting*, while the speculative order is concerned with knowledge for the sake of *knowing*. At the base of practical knowledge rest Maritain's concepts of *prudence* and *art*. Prudence is the *immediate* guide for directing moral action. Practical knowledge, as the regulator of action, is the virtue of prudence. Art is human action known as making. Prudence and art are carefully distinguished from each other though certainly not separated.<sup>2</sup>

Different from Immanuel Kant, Maritain sees that "ends play the role of *principles*."<sup>3</sup> Knowing and acting are intimately connected as ethics, politics and economics demonstrate. Although Jung appreciates humanist efforts, he realizes that:

Jacques Maritain, like other philosophic system builders, becomes excessively abstruse in his conceptualization and in his attempt to systematize into an integrated hierarchy all forms of human knowledge. His dialectic, his didacticism in definitions, his distinctions, contradistinctions, and above all his system of subalternation have become so conceptualized that they hardly sustain a concrete meaning for application to earthly situations.<sup>4</sup>

This "application to earthly situations" is a motto that Jung retains until the present day. Although Jung's relationship to Maritain's existentialism is far reaching and complicated, it eventually pressed him away from some of Maritain's abstractions. As a student of Henri Bergson, Maritain provided Jung with a deep analysis of Christianity, especially as a proponent of neo-Thomist thought, something that Jung carried with him to Moravian College in Pennsylvania where he taught for four decades. Maritain also was one of the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, sanctioned by the United Nations in 1948. As a political theorist, Jung was concerned with all of the above: existentialism, Christianity, universal rights. Although Maritain is still important for Jung today, he needed a way of connecting everything together. One of these ways was phenomenology of which Maritain was also a pioneer.

### **Existential Phenomenology**

In 1972, Jung edited a collection of essays entitled *Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory: A Reader*. This was one of the first full ranging selections on the phenomenology of the life-world. In the forward to this excellent book, Jung relates:

Political philosophy must begin with some understanding of the being of man, for its many problems develop from an inclusive grasp of man as he is. Since Husserl's discovery of the *Lebenswelt* and his writing of the *Crisis of European Sciences* in the early 1930's, many supposedly pure descriptive studies have been made. But it has turned out that such pure description, with its suppression of all extraneous interpretation, is by no means a simple or easy task. Many difficulties stand in the way. Many factors not readily noticed need to be brought into the light. Many obstinate prejudices must be suppressed. Many discoveries of this sort have been made in the last forty or fifty years, during what we may call the early ascendancy of phenomenology in Western Europe. Hence the real need for a book of this kind, in which many great phenomenologists from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty not only talk about the importance of their descriptions but actually make them.<sup>5</sup>

Phenomenology helps politics by opening up the possibility of fresh horizons. As Jung notes, "it was only in 1962 after many years of neglect, that the seminal and influential work of Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927) appeared in English translation."<sup>6</sup> John Wild introduced Jung to existential phenomenology in his seminars on Heidegger at Northwestern University during the 1961-62 term. In 1931, Wild had studied with Heidegger in Freiburg. Under Wild's editorship, Northwestern University Press completed its first publication on Merleau-Ponty's *In Praise of Philosophy* in 1963. At this time, Jung was also active in the creation of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP).

In summarizing the importance of phenomenology for political theory, Jung suggests that:

Phenomenology insists on the relevance of the all-encompassing horizon of meaning called the life-world to theoretical activity in philosophy and science. From beginning to end phenomenology is a descriptive analysis of the meaning of what is lived or directly experienced. The life-world refers to the complex living relationships of man to man in culture, in society, in history, and in politics. As a philosophy phenomenology is concerned with the meaning of theoretical inquiry into human existence and thus with the union of theory and practice, a problem of great importance to the theory of politics. To insist, as does phenomenology, on the primacy of lived reality and to insist that the construction of objective thought is derivative does not downgrade theoretical activity but places it in a proper perspective.<sup>7</sup>

Bringing the abstract stars down to earth is a crucial aspect of the *Lebenswelt* (the life-world) that Jung admired in the works of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Indeed, Edmund Husserl pronounced the role of the philosopher as the "civil servant of humanity" who, in Jung's image, would "integrate the two inseparable realms of theory and practice and values and facts in political life."<sup>8</sup>

In the 1960's and 1970's, Jung understood that phenomenology could help him meld the diverse horizons of philosophy, political theory, religion and culture. But what was he to do with the immense gap between the far Eastern world and the Western world, which is the gap between Eastern conceptions of philosophy and Western ones. Born in Korea during the Japanese occupation, Jung began his schooling under a traditional Japanese tutelage. Arriving in the United States—a very different environment—he completed his bachelor's and master's degrees at Emory University in Atlanta and a Ph.D. at the University of Florida. After this time, Jung began

to utilize phenomenology to understand the layerings of meaning *within* civilizations and *between* civilizations. In the late 1970's, Jung dedicates his book, *The Crisis of Political Understanding* to both his parents' love of education and to "John Wild *who introduced me to the Tao of phenomenology.*"<sup>9</sup> The "Tao (*Dao*) of phenomenology" is not an expression to be taken lightly. Jung is referring to the experiential aspect of life's way in its engagement with things, persons and events that are mutually conditioning. The understanding of a co-constitutive life-world is something that Jung draws from his close study of both Eastern philosophy and Western phenomenology. Almost an unknown fact was that John Wild also engaged with Asian thinkers, although not to the extent that Jung did. In one of his first Ph.D. courses taught on phenomenology at Yale University, Wild instructed two future kingpins in Chinese philosophy, Wu Kuang-ming and Cheng Chung-ying. Having studied Kant and existentialism at Yale with George Schrader and John E. Smith, Wu became known as a scholar of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi; having studied logic with Willard Quine at Harvard, Cheng became known as a scholar of Confucius and neo-Confucianism. Phenomenology impacted their thinking as it did Jung's. Jung also has enjoyed a forty year dialogue with Wu. Certainly Wu's ideas on *dao* have re-enforced Jung's own thoughts.<sup>10</sup>

### **Confucian Phenomenology**

In the late 1960's, Jung published two essays on Confucianism and phenomenology. At the time, these essays served as a path breaking intertwining of Eastern philosophy and existential phenomenology. One was entitled "*Jen: An Existential and Phenomenological Problem of Intersubjectivity*"<sup>11</sup> and another entitled "Confucianism and Existentialism: Intersubjectivity as the Way of Man."<sup>12</sup> In the latter, Jung argues that like phenomenology, Confucianism saw *ren* 仁 (benevolence) as "the truly uniquely human quality" of intersubjectivity.<sup>13</sup> Previously, philosophers who were eager to compare existentialism and Eastern philosophy had focused on Zen Buddhism. Jung states:

The Zen spirit, which expresses the unique Chinese mentality of practicality, also shuns empty speculation in philosophy—empty speculation in the sense that philosophical conceptualization is unrelated to the everyday life of man—and attempts to go beyond intellectualism, logicism and sheer verbalism. If Zen is an embodiment of the Chinese mentality, then the Chinese way of thinking is 'existential,' for it is concerned with the everyday experience of man as he lives it. The "practically-minded" Chinese would therefore agree with Merleau-Ponty who says that "the world is not what I think but what I live through" in association with others and the world as man perceives and lives it precedes the conceptualization of it.<sup>14</sup>

To this, Jung adds that Chinese philosophy (Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism) is a "practical humanism" of the life-world rooted in the importance of practice over theory. Confucianism is rooted in an agricultural society, hence its interest in "order" and "harmony"; existentialism is rooted in scientific reasoning, hence the concern with alienation as an identity crisis.

As such, Chinese philosophy relies on the everyday experiences to state its "radical premise": the roots of human beings are human beings themselves. Jung continues: "Chinese philosophy be-

gins with and ends in man. Unlike Heidegger, Confucius saw “fundamental ontology” as an end in itself in his philosophical analysis rather than a basic means to disclose the hiddenness of Being (*Sein*). For Confucius, there was no going ‘beyond humanism.’”<sup>15</sup> This is another one of Jung’s mottos for today: there is no going beyond humanism. It is one that helps shape his interdisciplinary scholarship.

### **The Phenomenology of the Ideogram**

Practicing what he preaches, Jung’s thought is not stationary. In the 1980’s, he embraced French post-structuralism and post-modernism as another way of engaging East-West dialogue. In *Paideuma: A Journal Devoted to Ezra Pound Scholarship*, Jung wrote a seminal essay entitled: “Misreading the Ideogram: From Fenollosa to Derrida and McLuhan”<sup>16</sup> which intricately blended Eastern and Western thought. Jung speaks of Ezra Pound’s invention of the “ideogrammic method” whereby “soaring columns of Chinese ideograms...shine like the glittering rays of the ‘sunrise’ (East) visible in and through the tree’s branches and leaves in the early morning.”<sup>17</sup> Jung goes on to describe Pound’s debt to Ernest Fenollosa’s “etymosinology”: “If Pound is the ‘inventor’ of Chinese poetry for our time, then Fenollosa deserves to be called its ‘arche-inventor’.”<sup>18</sup> Speaking phenomenologically, Jung recognizes the archaeology of etymosinology as a way of recovering “the inseparable connection between the Chinese language and culture in their historical patterns.”<sup>19</sup> Jung situates Fenollosa’s view of poetry and language as the “first language” of humanity in terms of the Neapolitan thinker Giambattista Vico “who made no distinction between Egyptian hieroglyphics and Chinese ideograms.”<sup>20</sup> For Vico, poetry was the origin of language. Like Vico, Fenollosa and Pound see language as a method of transforming “material images” into “immaterial relations.” For Jung, ideograms are both performative and kinetic: “Indeed, Chinese ideography (calligraphy in particular) is a kinetic art: it is the human body in motion.”<sup>21</sup> Jung learned to read Chinese from a Japanese mentor (and later his grandfather) in a similar way as Fenollosa learned Chinese. Anticipating the relationship between language and the phenomenology of the body, Jung quotes Vico’s *The New Science*:

...in all languages, the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions. Thus, head for top or beginning; the brow and shoulders of a hill; the eyes of needles and of potatoes; mouth for any opening; the lip of a cup or picture; the teeth of a rake, a saw, a comb; the beard of wheat; the tongue of a shoe; the gorge of a river; a neck of land, an arm of the sea; the hands of a clock; heart for center (the Latins used *umbilicus*, navel, in this sense); the belly of a sail; foot for end or bottom; the flesh of fruits; a vein of rock or mineral; the blood of grapes for wine; the bowels of the earth. Heaven or the sea smiles; the wind whistles; the waves murmur; a body groans under a great weight. The farmers of Latium used to say the fields were thirsty, bore fruit, were swollen with grain; and our rustics speak of plants making love, vines going mad, resinous trees weeping. Innumerable other examples could be collected from all languages.<sup>22</sup>

In traditional Asian learning, children see the ideogram as a whole or *Gestalt*. As Jung says, they do not “decipher the meaning of an ideogram by decomposing or dissecting it into a picture or into a composite of simpler characters or radicals.”<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, this “decompositional” or

“deconstructive” etymologistics is quite valuable. Jung uses the term “deconstruction” in a Heideggerian sense of destruction. Heidegger sees the latter “as a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are deconstructed down to the sources from which they were drawn.”<sup>24</sup> Fenollosa saw ideograms as “hypograms,” that is as Jung describes, “the corporate insemination of other ideograms.”<sup>25</sup> For example, Jung explains:

“East” is an entangling of “sun” with “tree” [*dong* 東] (i.e., the sun entangled in the branches of a tree in the early morning or at sunrise); “old” or “ancient” is a composite of “ten” and “mouth” [*gu* 古] (“ten” over “mouth,” i.e., presumably referring to what has come down through the mouth for ten generations); and “truth” or “faithfulness” is a composite of “man” and “word” [*xin* 信] (i.e., man standing by his word). Two of my favorite characters are “humanity” and “sage.” The former is a composite of “man” and “two” [*ren* 仁] (i.e., two men standing together) and the latter is a composite of “ear,” “mouth” and “king” [*sheng* 聖]. As the “king” is the unifier of heaven, man and earth, the “sage” is the unifier of heaven, man and earth by speaking and hearing truthfully. Furthermore, for the Chinese “nature” is signified by the ideograms: “ten thousand” and “things” [*wanwu* 萬物] (i.e., it is “ten thousand things”).<sup>26</sup>

In regard to the above, Jung sees Derrida’s deconstructive grammatology and Fenollosa and Pound’s etymopoetics as complementary. All three look to “an absolute interiorization of writing as an autonomous act.”<sup>27</sup> All three see the Chinese ideogram as an example of interiorization. Pound writes that: “Music rots when it gets *too far* from the dance. Poetry atrophies when it gets too far from music.”<sup>28</sup> Jung writes of Derrida: “The ultimate paradox—I say paradox because such concepts as ‘trace’ and ‘difference’ (deferment) indispensable to Derrida’s grammatology are ‘time’ concepts—of Derrida’s grammatology lies in the fact that when it murders the voice and resurrects the text, it tends to shrink time and stretch space.”<sup>29</sup> Jung continues that Derrida’s focus is on the “decipherment” of the text’s signification rather than “voice” and “sense” as others might argue. Jung sees ideographic writing itself as an articulation of speech that becomes a “grammatology by rhetoric”<sup>30</sup> through the use of several scripts including pictorial, associative compound, indicative, deflected, adoptive and phonetic. Hence, Chinese language itself represents multiple crossings of deconstructive scripts. The language itself is “diatactic” as Jung suggests. “Diatactics” is borrowed from Hayden White. For Jung, it is “neither ‘hypotactical’ (Hegelian conceptual overdetermination) nor ‘paratactical’ (Marxian conceptual underdetermination).”<sup>31</sup>

In other venues, Jung enjoys the use of the term ‘diatactics’ as “the logic of ontological difference”: “The term *diatactics*...[is] *the logic of correlating* two (or more) disparate phenomena as complementary. As it is spelled *dia/tactics*, moreover, it arouses literally the intimate sense of touch (tactility) and broadly the interplay of the senses including the incorporation of mind and body.”<sup>32</sup> Jung reconstructs the *Yijing* 易經 as an example of “...the ancient logic of correlation...a *horizontal* nexus of the multiple correlations of meanings on a cosmological scale...as a vectorial, complementary interplay of the *yin* element (negative: earth, moon, nature, night, female, left) and the *yang* element (positive: heaven, sun, history, day, male, right) as a ‘double helix.’”<sup>33</sup> Insightfully, Jung likens diatactics to Merleau-Ponty’s “hyperdialectic ambiguity,” the twice going round, which preserves the complementarity without resolve, that is, preserves the ontologi-

cal difference between *yin* and *yang*, rather than dissolve it in the name of identity, sameness and synthesis.<sup>34</sup>

Paraphrasing Dai Tong's 戴侗 *Six Graphic Principles* (*liu shu gu* 六書故), Jung explains that the Chinese ideogram is a matrix of possibilities where the spoken sound is *yang* 陽 and the written sign is *yin* 陰; the spoken sound is the warp and the written sign the woof; the spoken sound is circle and the written sign is square.<sup>35</sup> Jung's perspective owes to Fenollosa's insight that the Chinese character *is* the poetry itself. Marshall McLuhan, the Canadian communications *guru* sees the Chinese ideogram as Jung puts it, "arousing the sense of touch rather than of sight." Jung writes:

While Derrida is a conceptualist who seems to have been attracted by the 'abstract' aspect of Chinese ideography in order to substantiate his philosophical grammatology, McLuhan is, in contrast, a congenital perceptualist who seems to be attracted by the 'sensorial' aspect of Chinese ideograms as the medium of communication. No doubt both of them are interested in (Oriental) ideographic writing as opposed to (Occidental) alphabetic writing. For Derrida ideographic writing is purged of phoneticism, while for McLuhan it is anti-visual and tactile. As a philosophical grammatologist, Derrida has no use for writing as a medium of communication.<sup>36</sup>

### **In-betweenness: Barthes and Heidegger**

Drawing upon the merging of horizons of phenomenology, structuralism and post-structuralism, Jung finds various sites of in-betweenness both East and West. Roland Barthes, an important thinker in the semiological tradition accommodates one of these sites, especially because of his interest in East Asia. In an essay entitled "The Joy of Textualizing Japan: A Metacommentary on Roland Barthes' *Empire of Signs*,"<sup>37</sup> Jung launches into a hermeneutical analysis. Readers are immediately confronted with the three provocative epigrams that embellish the beginning of the essay. The first is a Zen Buddhist *jakugo* 着語 (著語) or *agyō* 下語 or "capping phrase" for which a Japanese monk searches after reaching a certain level of understanding of his *koan* 公案. It reads: *Kōgo tokitsukusazare* 好語不說盡. This defies translation and for Jung, that is a good thing. A good saying never ends the telling; a good saying does not exhaust speech; a good saying does not reach the end of speech; a good saying does not explain completely. These expressions are themselves never-ending interpretations that culminate in the thing itself: the expression. In modern Chinese, this expression carries the sense of the future in a positive way. Language can always outdo itself. He is a good teacher; he is a great teacher; he is a fantastic teacher! Interestingly enough, the corollary to this expression is still used in Chinese today. *Huai yu bu shuo jue* 坏語不說絕 or *huai yu bu shuo jin* 坏語不說盡. Bad words do not tell everything; bad words absolutely say nothing. These are expressions that align with Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian views of life.

Exhausted from an inability to find any one singular clarity, Buddhist monks come to the realization that life is not clear and not logical. This also embodies the Chinese Buddhist principle of *bu shuopo* 不說破, not explaining too clearly.<sup>38</sup> The Chinese is interesting. *Shuopo* 說破 carries the

literal meaning of “breaking” speech or the “destruction” of speech as unraveling speech or exposing meaning. Perhaps it even carries the sense of breaking out (of silence) into speech. Not unraveling or not breaking or not exposing is the Buddhist idea of not completely explaining out or not explaining too plainly. Jung’s *jakugo* of the endless hermeneutics of speech also recalls the old Confucian expression: *chen mo shi jin* 沉默是金, silence is golden. The expression carries the idea of “sinking” into silence and embracing a “golden” saying. Jung places the *jakugo* expression above Barthes’ “*l’écriture est...un satori*,” writing is a *satori* 悟 (awakening). These are followed by the Zen Master Okada Torajiro’s comment that: “Nowadays the way of educating as well as the way of learning is wrong. True knowledge is not in the written word. Books are always ‘translations.’ The ‘original’ is what is by its own nature.”<sup>39</sup>

In a refreshing view of Barthes’ 1966 trip to Japan, Jung begins by looking at the cover of *Empire of Signs* for phenomenological speaking, the exterior is as important as the interior. In looking at various editions and translations of the text from French to Japanese, Jung writes:

The outer box has a separate wrapper with the photograph of a traditional, aristocratic, anonymous courtly woman that could easily depict a scene from the *Genji monogatari*. The picture is explained in the French original simply as “Fragment d’une carte postal,” reminding us of Jacques Derrida’s recent work on Freud. Without doubt the woman is the sur/faceal *centerfold* of *Empire of Signs*, which is consonant with Barthes’s own semiological approach. As a picture is worth a thousand words, the woman is the ‘*studium*’ where Barthes displays the multicolored galaxy of signifiers in Japanese culture. First, it is a picture. As such it *de/sign/ates* the presence of Japan in absence. In photograph, according to Barthes, form and content coincide. The literal message of the woman (denotation) is not clear, but its symbolic message (connotation) is worth exploring...Zen is the inner soul of Japanese culture, and writing is for Barthes Zen’s *satori*—an inner awakening or enlightenment...As a nation of ideograms or pictograms, Japan is a graphic bliss or nirvana.<sup>40</sup>

We might add that the Heian courtesan on the cover of the English edition (perhaps Sei Shonagon, author of the diary *Pillow Book*) is a calligrapher who erases herself as she writes while disappearing into the “emptiness of language” as Barthes might say. Anticipating the multiple representations and simulations of the text, the cover is a postcard of a photograph of a painting of a wax doll, the sort that one might have seen in small town museums in rural Japan in the 1950’s. According to Jung: “*Empire of Signs* is the testimonial of an itinerant pilgrim—not unlike the Zen monk Hoshi who, too, traveled to China in the beginning of the Tang period in search of Zen (*satori*)—in search of semiological markings (*shirushi*) in all things Japanese whose epicenter is writing (*écriture*).”<sup>41</sup>

Alongside Barthes, much has been written recently on the engagement of Heidegger with Eastern thinkers from Kuki Shuzo in the 1920’s, to Xiong Wei in the 1930’s to Paul Xiao and Nishitani Keiji in the 1940’s, to Tezuka Tomio in the 1950’s to Chang Chungyuan in the 1970’s.<sup>42</sup> Jung was one of the pioneers in the discussion of Heidegger’s relationship to East Asian thought. In the late 1980’s, he wrote an essay entitled “Heidegger’s Way with Sinitic Thinking.” In particular, Jung is concerned with the merging of horizons of Heidegger’s poetic turn and Asian poetry. Consequently, his own essay is “an exercise in what Giambattista Vico calls *ingenium*, that is, the power of connecting separate and diverse elements in Heidegger and Sinitic thinking.”<sup>43</sup> The

Chinese idea of complementary opposites (*yin-yang*) and Heidegger's ontological difference are both correlational and diatactical. Hence, Heidegger's *Sein* and the Chinese *dao* are parallel in so far as they reveal as they conceal. Jung is referring to the famous passage in Heidegger's *On the Way to Language*:

The word 'way' probably is an ancient primary word that speaks to the reflective mind of man. The key word in Laotse's poetic thinking is *Tao*, which properly speaking means way. But because we are prone to think of 'way' superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our word 'way' has all too rashly been considered unfit to name what *Tao* says. *Tao* is then translated as reason, mind, *raison*, meaning, *logos*. Yet *Tao* could be the way that gives all ways, the very source of our power to think what reason, mind, meaning, *logos* properly mean to say—properly, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals itself in the word 'way,' *Tao*, if only we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are capable of this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power of today's reign of method also, and indeed pre-eminently, stems from the fact that the methods, notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of a great hidden stream which moves all things along and makes way for everything. All is way.<sup>44</sup>

Through this, Jung is attracted to Heidegger's dictum: questioning is the piety of thinking. We live in language as an "embodied phenomenon." Reminiscent of Vico's body language, Heidegger thinks of thinking as a "handicraft": "Only a being who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can be handy in achieving works of handicraft...All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking."<sup>45</sup>

For Heidegger, thinking is "receptive" and "reverential" according to Jung. Thinking, speaking and the hand form a kind of "filial unity."<sup>46</sup> Piety of thinking is also a thanking. As Jung suggests: "For Heidegger, the old German word *thanc* is memory, and thinking that recalls is thanking."<sup>47</sup> Jung continues that: "Piety as reciprocity is also genuinely Sinitic—Confucian, Taoist, and Zen."<sup>48</sup> Humaneness (*ren* 仁) and filial piety (*xiao* 孝) are but two of a web of Sinitic "social principles." Early Heidegger might represent the conviviality of Confucian piety (between people) while later Heidegger might represent a broader Daoist or Zen piety (between humanity and nature). For Jung, Heidegger's thinker as poet strives toward serenity in a way parallel to Japanese *haiku* 俳句 poets such as the Buddhist monk Bashō. Also akin to Daoist meditation is Heidegger's *gelassenheit* (releasement) that embraces the "natural" and "spontaneous." Heidegger writes: "A higher acting is concealed in releasement than is found in all the actions within the world and the machinations of all mankind."<sup>49</sup> For Jung, Heidegger's calling of Being as a piety of thinking is similar to the Chinese invisible primordial vapor that manifests itself in writing.<sup>50</sup> When Jung invokes the Confucian rectification of names (*zhengming* 正名) as "calling things by their right (rite) names," we immediately think of Heidegger's authenticity. If *zhengming* as a Confucian image aligns with early Heidegger, then perhaps *chengming* 澄明 as a Daoist image aligns with later Heidegger. *Chengming* is the Chinese translation for *Lichtung* (the clearing). In Heidegger's later works, he moves from *Dichtung* to *Lichtung*, which is from poetry to the clearing. *Chengming* invokes the idea of limpid water with the sediment settled out and with a kind of translucent clarity.<sup>51</sup> It is a perfect fit for Heidegger since it evokes images from Laozi's clearing

of muddied waters, Poem Fifteen from *Daodejing* 道德經. Heidegger strives for this tranquil clarity in moving through poetry to the quietude of *Lichtung*.<sup>52</sup>

### Vico's Sinitic Mindset

Building upon his reflections concerning Heidegger and Barthes, Jung presents another rendering of diatactics entitled “The Anatomy of Language: Vico, Joyce and Etymosinology.”<sup>53</sup> Taking language as a common ground for both Confucius and Vico, Jung writes:

Vico's ‘civic humanism’ with its accent on the *vita activa*, I submit, would be quite at home with the Sinitic mindset, especially with the ‘practical humanism’ of Confucius embodied in the concept of *jen* ([仁] humanity) based on the *sensus communis* if one dares to thumb through the weighty leaves of the Chinese classics—including the *Analects*—which edify the ‘moral sciences’ (politics, ethics, and jurisprudence) crowned by the ancient ‘art of rulership’ (*wang shu* [王術]) as the symbol of a cosmic unity. To understand the ‘echoland’ of Vico's thought and Sinism we need to engage in the full-scale ‘translation’ as the ‘diplomacy’ or ‘foreign relations’ of language.<sup>54</sup>

Jung proceeds to “interlock the ‘cartwheels’ of language” in the works of Vico, Joyce and Fenollosa/Pound's etymosinology. Jung's understanding of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's body phenomenology speaks in the following passage on the ideogram:

It is a cosmion or a grouping of cosmions with a ‘radical’ as its basic element or structural pillar...The ideogram is called a *character* for good reason. Its ‘soul’ is meaning and its ‘body’ is the external sign or ‘image’ that trailmarks the whereabouts of its soul. The ideogram is in short the ‘corporation’ of meaning and the body. It, we might say, the word *made flesh*—the flesh in the sense of the synergistic incarnation of the visible and the invisible which is neither spirituality nor materiality pure and simple but is, like earth, air, water and fire, an ‘element of Being.’ The *rhetoric* of the ideogram is in essence a performance in the fullest sense of the term—that is, being active, corporeal, and ethical at the same time.<sup>55</sup>

In *Ulysses*, James Joyce's image that “sounds are impostures” connects to the Chinese character because “the ideogram is the *persona*, that is, the mask of speech.”<sup>56</sup> For Jung, “corporeal movement” becomes the supreme accomplishment of the ideogram's performance. Likewise, Vico's “linguistic anatomy” finds speech “midway between mind and body.” In terms of the universal etymology, Vico writes in *The New Science*: “words are carried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spirit.”<sup>57</sup> Words collect mind and body, humans and nature.

While Jung lays out the philosophical intersections of Vico and Chinese philosophy, we can also recall briefly the historical connections. In the 18th C., Naples stood in the midst of the Western world under Spanish rule. China stood in the midst of the Eastern world under Manzhou 滿洲 rule. Both rulerships were advantageous to scholars such as Vico. While China was in the process of assembling all the books in the known world, Italian scholars were happy to bring this knowledge to the West. Whereas Leibniz was influenced by the milieu of Father Matteo Ricci

(1552-1610), who as Jung relates built the “Memory Palace” by decomposing the ideograms for war, need, profit and goodness,<sup>58</sup> Vico was influenced by the milieu of Father Matteo Ripa (1692-1746). Ripa had lived for many years at the court of *Kangxi*, Emperor of China’s *Qing* Dynasty. When Ripa returned to Italy, he brought with him copper engravings of world maps and garden vistas complete with Chinese poetry. Ripa introduced a few Chinese scholars to Naples where he established *Collegia dei Cinesi* (The Chinese Institute).<sup>59</sup> Vico characterized society in terms of a “poetic cosmography,” a physical mapping of the world of gods, heroes and humans. As a humanist, Vico did not believe in the overdetermining of rationalism through physical and mathematical sciences to the exclusion of the arts of philosophy and history. Through each of these vehicles, humans could attempt to recover the essence of society. Vico dubs this “conatus,” a primordial beginning or striving “proper to the human will.”<sup>60</sup> With “conatus” in mind, Vico embarks on a mission to uncover this beginning through various stages of history: the age of gods, the age of heroes and the age of men (humans). Vico is clearly indebted to ancient Chinese and Greco-Roman thought. Divine written characters (hieroglyphs) were used “by all nations in their beginnings.”<sup>61</sup> Like the Egyptians, the Chinese maintained “the vanity of their imagined remote antiquity.”<sup>62</sup>

Jung makes sense of the above through Claude Lévi-Strauss. Whereas Vico’s “cavus” (hollow, pit) as the beginning of language was a fusion of *logos* and *mythos*, Levi-Strauss saw that myth as a “bundle of events” should be interpreted musically like “an orchestral score”; it should be read “not only from left to right, but at the same time vertically, from top to bottom.”<sup>63</sup> Jung notes that this reading is similar to the reading of the radicals of a single Chinese ideogram from left to right and from top to bottom.

In addition to Jung’s perceptive commentary, we think of Merleau-Ponty’s “chiasm.” The chiasm is somewhere between the mind of the body and the body of the mind, “a certain hollow, a certain interior, a certain absence, a negativity that is not nothing.”<sup>64</sup> This is similar to Vico’s “conatus” or “the endeavor” or “the striving” between mind and body that allows us to become through language. In turn, both are reminiscent of the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi’s expression, “the hollows are made empty” (*qiao wei xu* 窈為虛)<sup>65</sup> whereby a multitude of things are created in the floating spaces between the binaries of subject and object, self and other, interior and exterior. These landscapes are rich with traces of ancient and anticipated resonance.<sup>66</sup>

## **Carnal Hermeneutics**

Beginning with the Chinese Confucian virtue of benevolence (*ren*), followed by etymosinology and diatactics, Jung navigates through phenomenology, ethics, politics and postmodernism. In the late 1990’s, he published two essays on postmodernism entitled “Writing the Body as Social Discourse: Prolegomena to Carnal Hermeneutics”<sup>67</sup> and “Phenomenology and Body Politics.”<sup>68</sup> These essays outline the next feature in his analysis: the idea of “carnal hermeneutics.” Jung sees postmodern thought as demarcated by a “rainbow coalition of many splendid things; it is a colorful polygraph.”<sup>69</sup> To this, he adds that carnal hermeneutics constitutes:

...an ‘application’ of hermeneutics or interpretation theory and its procedures to the reading of the body as social text or inscription in the world, which would include such basic and diverse forms of the body’s communicative performance as gesture, pantomime, dance, and boxing, as well as speech acts. It is an incorporation of conceptual categories concerning all the aspects, dimensions, levels, pivots, configurations, and representations, both verbal and nonverbal, of the body’s *habitus* and practice; that is, of the body politic.<sup>70</sup>

Jung is attentive to the East Asian ability to situate silence as a form of communications through human gestures. He writes:

Anybody who is slightly acquainted with the Chinese ideogram would recognize it as a choreography of the body whose artistic rendition called calligraphy is the (brush) ‘painting’ of the body as ideogram. Calligraphy is a pantomimic art, somatography. It is a balletic parade in rite order that generates corporate energy—to emulate the pungent language of Marshall McLuhan. Ideograms are metaphors of the body itself. As a family of signifiers or semantemes, Chinese ideography is a conversation of gestures. For it the body is the silent spring of language whether it be spoken, written, ‘signed,’ or gesticulated.<sup>71</sup>

As such, carnal hermeneutics stands against Western philosophy’s predominance of “disembodied reason.” Jung’s carnal hermeneutics might parallel Wu Kuang-ming’s Chinese body thinking. Wu suggests that Chinese philosophy connects the mind and body in a way different from Western thinking as exemplified in the ideogram for heart-mind (*xin* 心). For Wu, the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Chinese body-thinking is the difference between ‘argumentative self-critical clarification’ and ‘spontaneous praxis’:

...Merleau-Ponty in the West can learn from China that, *after* having argued, demonstrated, and exhibited the truth and importance of body thinking, he should *forget* about it all, and directly plunge into a soaring naturalness of body thinking itself—as in Mencius’s spontaneous engagement in a hot metaphysico-political argumentation, as in Chuang Tzu’s cool self-loss and roaming nonchalance in the world.<sup>72</sup>

Employing an encyclopedic knowledge of both traditions, Wu argues the following: the West thinks too much with the mind. When this happens, the body disappears. Hence, we have thousands of years of debates over the irreconcilability of the mind/body split. The East allows the body to do the thinking while the mind transdescends or drops down into it. Hence, Chinese body thinking relies on the heart/mind (*xin*). Ironically, Eastern body thinking is thus “concrete,” while Western rationalist thought is “abstract.” Yet, Eastern and Western philosophy are co-resonating and complementary as *yin-yang* polarities, since they both rely on the metaphors of daily speech. After all, life needs both rationality and irrationality, both order and chaos. Wu sees Merleau-Ponty as parallel to Zhuangzi and Laozi in curtailing a philosophy overburdened with the materiality of correspondence. Yet phenomenology could not have been without science and the rationalist tradition to which it responded. In speaking of the “transparency” of the “thing itself,” Merleau-Ponty shuns the Western preoccupation with clinical analysis in favor of “...giving them the hollow, the free space they ask for in return, the resonance they require, who

follows their own movement, who is therefore not a nothingness the full being would come to stop up, but a question consonant with the porous being which it questions...”<sup>73</sup>

Implicitly agreeing with the above, Jung looks to Vico’s sense of language as an embodied phenomenon that silently guides both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Both Merleau-Ponty’s body as being and body as having alongside Heidegger’s embodied thinking are examples of carnal hermeneutics. In particular, Heidegger’s thinking as handicraft “...reveres the combined, diatactical tradition of Democritus and Anaxagoras, who recognized the significance for humanity of the hand and the mouth, respectively...In Heidegger’s view, thinking, speaking, and the hand, which is always moving while being still, form a filial union. The hand is ‘the piety of thinking.’”<sup>74</sup>

Alongside carnal hermeneutics is phenomenology as a “perpetual beginner.” Recalling Merleau-Ponty, Jung sees phenomenology as “the constant vigilance which would not let us forget the source and resource of all knowledge and action in life-worldly experience.”<sup>75</sup> Hence the end of phenomenology is perpetually the retelling of its beginning. Once again, for Jung, phenomenology and postmodernism are forever entwined by way of “body politics.” This convergence is what Jung names “phenomenological aesthetics.”<sup>76</sup> Through body politics, phenomenology can “reterritorialize” philosophy itself. Echoing Vico’s “conatus,” Merleau-Ponty sees the body as neither mind, nor matter nor substance but rather “midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being.”<sup>77</sup> The intercorporeality of the body is “the umbilical cord to the social.”<sup>78</sup> Drawing on Heidegger, the body as flesh is also ethical for Jung. A touch can be a touch of caring. Jung relates: “Invoking the fable of Hyginus, Heidegger intimates that human existence is inspirited with care which shapes *homo* with its body (*corpus*) as the gift of *humus* (earth).”<sup>79</sup> To this, Jung adds the idea of “corporeal feminism” which subverts “phallocratic monism” on the way to “selfless care.”<sup>80</sup>

### **Comparative Political Culture and Transversality**

Existential phenomenology, etymosinology, diatactics, and carnal hermeneutics have global implications. All of these strategies resist Western metaphysics. In his lifetime concern to generate a global political theory, Jung has visited many nations in the world, participated in many international conferences and contributed to bringing his thought to all those countries including Korea where he is a pioneer in an East-West dialogue, especially in regards to phenomenology.

In 2002, Jung edited a collection of essays entitled *Comparative Political Culture in the Age of Globalization: An Introductory Anthology*. The introductory essay begins with a quote from Derrida: “[T]he critique of ethnocentrism...should be systematically and historically contemporaneous with the destruction of the history of [Western] metaphysics. Both belong to a single and same era.”<sup>81</sup> All of the essays in the book aspire to a type of deconstruction that is not negative but rather accedes to the possibilities of cross-cultural communications. In their respective ways, Heidegger, Derrida and Merleau-Ponty engage the architecture of philosophy by digging down to the roots of the way we speak, write, think and act, thereby exposing the conditions and possi-

bilities of life in a global age. Jung reminds us that Merleau-Ponty maintained that all history should be written in the present; the end of philosophy must always be a discussion of its beginning. In the famous essay, "Everywhere and Nowhere" reprinted in Jung's collection, Merleau-Ponty writes:

What we have learned about the historical relations of Greece and the Orient, and inversely, all the 'Western' characteristics we have discovered in Oriental thought (Sophistry, Skepticism, elements of dialectics and logic), forbid us to draw a geographical frontier between philosophy and non-philosophy...Simply rallying and subordinating "non-philosophy" to true philosophy will not create the unity of the human spirit. It already exists in each culture's lateral relationships to the others, in the echoes one awakens in the other...Indian and Chinese philosophies have tried not so much to dominate existence as to be the echo or the sounding board of our relationship to being. Western philosophy can learn from them to rediscover the relationship to being and initial option which gave it birth, and to estimate the possibilities we have shut ourselves off from in becoming "Westerners" and perhaps reopen them.<sup>82</sup>

Inspired by these words, many of the participants in Jung's anthology, including Fred Dallmayr merge horizons of East and West in an attempt to go beyond Orientalism by searching for a cosmopolitan outlook in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's lateral relationships. Jung writes of our communal task:

In conclusion, 'going global' or planetary dwelling is an arduous task. Transversality is the theoretical underpinning of becoming a global citizen (*homo globatus*) or cosmopolitan who feels at home in the pluralistic world beyond the modernist division of the world as nation-states. For the transversalist, globalization means to decenter Western hegemony and disclaim Western superiority thereby empowering the non-West to participate fully in the new worldmaking as an act of hybridization or imbrication. We must keep in mind Heidegger's prompting us many years ago not to give up the effort to practice planetary thinking along a stretch of the road, be it ever so short. Here too no prophetic talents and demeanor are needed to realize that there are in store for planetary building encounters to which participants are by no means equal...In the age of globalization or planetary building, the transversalist is one who is willing at all cost to facilitate cross-geocultural border-crossings without passports.<sup>83</sup>

In effect, Marshall McLuhan's strategy for cutting across the boundaries of human and mass communications is similar to what Jung calls "transversality," a concept that permeates his thought in the last several years. What Wu Kuang-ming calls "world philosophy" or "world interculturalism," Jung calls the "transversal world." For Jung, the transversal world "is a result of cross-cultural exchanges of ideas and values, that is, of forging the world of hyphenations and hybridities."<sup>84</sup> Transversality compensates for the limits of both the localized and the generalized, leaving the way open for a communications theory of in-between. It is a crossing of borders on the diagonal of discourse. It is not bounded by the circles or squares of Euclidean geometry that dominates Western thought. Beyond its geometric constraints, transversality is "the crossroads of truth across the boundaries of different cultures: it is the way of thinking about truth cross-culturally."<sup>85</sup> Stimulated by Merleau-Ponty's idea of cross-cultural transformation of universality, the postmodernist Felix Guattari and the phenomenologist Calvin Schrag see transversality as an overcoming of both the verticality of "totalitarian hegemony" and the horizontality of

“anarchic multiplicity.” Drawing from their understandings, Jung explains transversality metaphorically:

...transversality may be likened to the famous wooden statue of Buddha at a Zen temple in Kyoto whose face marks the dawn of ‘enlightenment’ (*satori*) or signals the beginning of a new regime of knowledge and morals. From the crack in the middle of the old face in the Buddha’s statue, there emerges an interstitial, liminal face that signifies a new transfiguration. Since the new face emerges from the middle, it also symbolizes the arrival of Maitreya (i.e., the ‘future Enlightened One’) or Maitreyan, Middle Way. Thus the ‘new face’ of transversality as inter-face points to the emergence of the ‘middle’ or ‘third’ term which mediates and permits disciplinary and cultural border crossings.<sup>86</sup>

Following Heidegger, Jung sees a boundary as a point of departure or a beginning rather than an ending, something that begins its presencing rather than terminates it. Jung sees transversality as bringing to the forefront the importance of non-Western thought. He carries forward Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “lateral universal” in asking Westerners to put their money where their mouth is, as does the Chinese sage. More eloquently put, Jung recalls Merleau-Ponty: “...if Western thought is what it claims to be, it must prove it by understanding all ‘life-worlds.’”<sup>87</sup> In a 2006 online publication in *Ex/Change* entitled “Transversality and Comparative Culture,”<sup>88</sup> Jung opts for a replacement to the Western idea of “universality” with that of “trans(uni)versality”:

It [trans(uni)versality] goes beyond the hierarchized binary oppositions, for example, between mind and body, man and woman, humanity and nature, and West and East. What is particular in the West is universalized or universalizable, whereas what is particular in the East remains forever particular and marginalized.<sup>89</sup>

Jung himself stands in-between the this and the that of everyday experience where he embraces the cultural pluralism of hyphenizations and hybridizations as they dissolve the old binaries of relativism and universalism. As he succinctly writes: “Transversality is a new face in the miscengenerating middle, as it were, for the age of multiculturalism and globalization which is not one but many. There can be no one philosophy which monopolizes truth: truth is concentric or transversal.”<sup>90</sup>

## NOTES

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7. *Ibid.*, p. xlvi.

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  33. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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  37. Hwa Yol Jung, "The Joy of Textualizing Japan: A Metacommentary on Roland Barthes' *Empire of Signs*," in *The Question of Rationality and the Basic Grammar of Intercultural Texts* (Niigata: International University of Japan, 1989), pp. 83-112.
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  39. Jung, "The Joy of Textualizing Japan," p. 83.
  40. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
  41. Ibid., p. 95.
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