



Notes on Comparative Philosophy: the Case of Buddhism and Deconstruction

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- ¶1. This essay^[1] discusses the changing relationship between Buddhism and continental philosophy and explicates major issues involved in this comparative philosophy. The first section identifies the ground of conflict between Buddhist doctrines and traditional Western thought, especially in the context of European metaphysics by briefly reviewing basic doctrines of Buddhism. The second part introduces Derridean deconstruction as a turning point in the East-West dialogue and examines the spirit of Derridean deconstruction through its relation to the metaphysical tradition as well as Buddhist thought. Similarities between Buddhism and deconstruction having been demarcated, the third section is allotted to clarify the differences between the two in connection with the problematic issues involved in the comparative study. I conclude with a consideration of the contribution of this project to the East-West dialogue in general.

1. The Incompatible: Buddhism and European Metaphysical Tradition

- ¶2. Buddhist studies in the West have a relatively short history.^[2] The motivation that initiated this scholarship was not all pure either. Socio-political issues aside, the first generation European Buddhist scholars encountered difficulty in understanding Buddhist doctrines in any positive way primarily due to the difference in the frame of thought between Buddhist tradition on the one hand and Judeo-Christian/Greek-metaphysical thinking on the other. Attempts to interpret Buddhist tradition from a European perspective without considering this difference only resulted in a purely negative evaluation of the religion. Hence, for the first generation European Buddhologists, Buddhism was a religion full of negative and even “horrible” tenets, teaching the “disappearance of individual,” culminating in the concept of nirvana which to them cannot be anything but a desire for “the absolute nothing.”^[3]
- ¶3. The negative portrayal of the religion can also be found in the European philosopher’s understanding of Buddhism. In his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel placed Buddhism in the primitive stage of the evolution of world religions and described it as a religion of an “annihilation.”^[4] Such a negative view carried over to the twentieth century. Karl Jaspers, for example, overwhelmed by the negative aspect of this religion, declared the impossibility of being a Western Buddhist: “To participate in the essence of Buddha’s truth, we should have to cease to be what we are. The difference lies not in rational position but in the whole view of life and manner of thinking.”^[5] At the core of this incompatibility between Buddhist and western thought speculated by the scholars and thinkers of nineteenth century Europe lies (1) the Buddhist denial of the existence of self, (2) its refusal to accept permanent grounding for being and the world, and (3) the Buddhist teaching of suffering and extinction of passion and desire as its goal. In the following, I will briefly elucidate these issues in order to clarify the ground of the seeming incompatibility between Buddhism and Western thought.
- ¶4. Most comprehensive theoretical ground of Buddhist teaching can be found in the Buddhist doctrine of "Dependent Co-arising" (Sk. pratitya-samupada, literally “in dependence, things rise up”). In the texts of early Buddhism one frequently encounters a classical interpretation of this concept as follows: "This is, because that is. This is not, because that is not. This comes to be, because that comes to be. This ceases to be, because that ceases to be." The idea is that existence of an entity or a being is always contingent or conditioned by many other factors that constitute that existence. This Buddhist doctrine is compatible with the concept of causation except that in Dependent Co-arising, the causation takes place in multiple levels. There are multiple causes and effects and each of them carries with it its own temporal dimension. Being is a result of multiple causes and effects on the horizontal level plus their temporal dimensions on the vertical level. At the crossroad of these multi-dimensional functions lies one’s existence. In other words, for one individual incident to take place (or for an individual being to exist) there are uncountable factors working together.

- ¶5. Out of the doctrine of interconnectedness of beings, we can draw two major Buddhist concepts, which are the theories of nonself (Sk. anatman) and impermanence (Sk. anitya). The former marks a spatial understanding of the doctrine of the Dependent Co-arising, while the latter shows its temporal aspect.
- ¶6. A being in Buddhism is always already a result of co-arising (simultaneous happening) of different elements that together constructs a self. There is then no one specific element which we can call a self in a being; the sense of “self” is an illusion, for a being is an “interbeing” to borrow Thich Nhat Hanh’s term: “If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper.
- ¶7. The cloud is essential for the paper to exist. If the cloud is not here, these sheet of paper cannot be here either. So we can say that the cloud and the paper inter-are.”[\[6\]](#)
- ¶8. Since beings inter-are, and interactions among the members of the cosmos function in the level which cannot decisively distinguish the identity of the one from another, identity of a being is always “between identity” and hence identity is non-identity. What one casually mistakes for a self is actually a non-self, which constitutes one of the Three Dharma Seals in Buddhism.
- ¶9. It is not difficult to move from here to another of the Three Seals, i.e., the Buddhist doctrine of “impermanence.” Nothing can remain the same for two consecutive second, for their conditions are constantly changing by multiple function of causation. Hence, impermanence, from the Buddhist perspective, characterizes all the existing things in the world.
- ¶10. Dependent Co-arising with its temporal aspect of “impermanence” and spatial interpretation of “nonself” is also understood by another key Buddhist concept, that is, “emptiness (Sk. sunyata).” Buddhist emptiness, as many scholars have tried to explain, is not to be understood from a nihilist perspective toward life. Emptiness, as Nagarjuna identifies it with the nature of Dependent Co-arising, refers to the emptiness of a permanent self. Since a being is always already interconnected with various different factors, and therefore, no one factor can be identified as the identity of a being, a being is empty, and this emptiness (of a permanent, independent self) is fullness (of other co-existing elements.)

- ¶11. As a philosophical doctrine, Buddhism provides the vision of inter-connectedness of all beings with an emphasis on differential notion and temporality as a groundless-grounding of the world and being. As a religion, Buddhism arouses people to the reality of this differential and temporal ground of existence and teaches them two opposite consequences that come about as a result of one's understanding (or misunderstanding) of this reality. Suffering, the term with which Buddhists describe the life in the pre-enlightenment period, is not a pessimistic vision; rather it is the reality when an individual refuses to accept this fact. And nirvana, the extinction of false view, is the state of total awareness of this reality of Dependent Co-arising.
- ¶12. That said, place side by side the basic concepts of Buddhism with European metaphysics, and the incompatibility of the two traditions seems inevitable: the theory of nonself vs. Cartesian Ego Cogito; impermanence vs. the world of Idea and Logos; the nondual vision of interconnectedness of beings based on the theory of Dependent Co-arising vs. the dualistic world of clear distinction based on the principle of identity.
- ¶13. In the European encounter of Buddhism, the seeming incompatibility, however, seems less a problem than the incapacity and unwillingness to see the other side from their perspective. For example, to Europeans the concept of Buddhist nonself is horrible because it demands to “annihilate” the self, the Ego-Cogito which is the very ground of one’s existence in European metaphysical tradition. From the Buddhist perspective, however, there is nothing to annihilate because the self does not exist from the beginning. By the same token, the teaching of nirvana-extinction as a goal to be achieved can be a pessimistic vision to Europeans; however again, from the Buddhist perspective, sunyata or nirvana cannot be a negative concept, for it projects the reality of multiple causation of being and the world. Emergence of new philosophical orientation within the continental philosophy brings this irreconcilable encounter to a turning point.

2. The Turning - Derrida and Co.

- ¶14. Derridean deconstruction begins by marking a gap in a discourse. When the principle of identity is sustained as a ground for the thinking process, philosophical speculation and linguistic theory, a discourse can be credited as a consistent presentation on the topic being discussed. It is like having an independent identity that is distinct from other discourses. However, once a possibility of contingency in any one element within a discourse is recognized and accepted, a possible gap or contradiction will emerge on the horizon and remain there. To Derrida, no discourse can enjoy the privilege of the security of identity or consistency once we accept the fact that we are working with language which functions on a differential base. This is the very point of departure in Derridean deconstruction, which was originally named grammatology, the science of writing (and reading). By marking the gap and fissure in a discourse

through a close reading of a text, Derrida aims to dismantle, destabilize and delimit the scope of a text and further inscribe the limit of the metaphysical thinking.

- ¶15. From early on, Derrida has declared the nature of his project as nothing less than a total reconsideration of the two thousand year history of Western philosophical tradition. This seemingly daring and ambitious plan was not a mission impossible, mainly because there is, as Derrida claims, a theme that has run through this entire tradition: the principle of presence, the principle of identity and the presence of essence-identity-truth. Derrida identifies the five types of thematic variations of this metaphysical thinking: they are, logocentrism, egocentrism, phonocentrism, phallogentrism, and ethnocentrism.
- ¶16. These have been the totality of European metaphysical tradition which has claimed the existence (presence) of permanent truth (logocentrism); the existence/presence of rational, independent self (egocentrism); the presence of sound (speech) as a revelation of truth as opposed to writing which has been mistreated as a copy of the sound (phonocentrism); and the presence of the power of a specific gender which happened to be male (phallogentrism); and the reality/presence of the superiority of a certain race which has been the Europeans (ethnocentrism). These centrisms anchor themselves on a hierarchical understanding of the two elements in the binary opposites, and the binary opposites in turn function on the ground of the principle of identity.
- ¶17. Derrida was not the only one who launched a war against metaphysical tradition. The spirit was there already in continental philosophy even as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. Freudian psychoanalysis has discovered unconsciousness, the unknown realm within an individual, threatening the concept of Cartesian modern man who has anchored the certainty of his existence on reason. Later Lacan's theory of the split subject declares the impossibility of carrying on with the Ego-Cogito as a ground for the certainty of one's existence. Further, post-structuralism of Michel Foucault prophecies the disappearance of human episteme, the star player of the modern period, from the shore of human science.^[7] And the postmodern philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard has symbolically defined the nature and the result of modernist philosophy when he declares that Auschwitz is a "paradigmatic name for the tragic 'incompletion' of modernity."^[8]
- ¶18. In order to carry out his project of deconstruction, Derrida introduces two deconstructive operators, i.e., *différance* and *trace*, both of which are not totally new concepts. As Derrida has identified five thinkers as precursors for the birth of *différance*,^[9] de Saussure's semiological difference and Heidegger's onto-ontological difference work as forerunners for Derridean *différance* while Freud's memory-trace and Levinas' trace of the Other do this for his concept of trace.

- ¶19. In semiological difference, each sign obtains its identity by its difference from other signs in a linguistic system, hence, de Saussure claims that “in language there are only differences... without positive terms”[\[10\]](#) (emphasis original). In Heidegger’s ontico-ontological difference, a being is situated in the space between ontic and ontological levels. In both cases, “difference” functions to subvert the traditional metaphysical thinking: that is, metaphysical understanding of the sign in terms of the principle of identity on the one hand and the essentialization of the Being in the metaphysical tradition on the other.
- ¶20. To Derrida, however, de Saussure’s semiological difference and the Heideggerian ontico-ontological difference present its own limit. They still remain in the realm of structure (in the case of de Saussure) and onto-theology (in the case of Heidegger). Derridean *différance* is differ-deferring, and in order to complete the function, Derrida needs to show the constant interruption, the violation of deferring process in our thought and language for which he introduces another operator, trace.
- ¶21. Trace is the violence of *différance*. Like Levinas’ concept of the trace as the immanent existence of the Other within a being and Freud’s theory of the memory-trace and its role in the construction of self, trace is the ultimate renunciation of the principle of presence and identity.
- ¶22. By employing these deconstructive operators, Derrida marks the gap, fissures and contradictions within a text which has been accepted as a coherent entity. The goal is to dismantle the metaphysical ideas of presence, the Being, the center and the origin. Despite the complicity Derrida’s texts reveal, Derrida has been using a noticeable strategy in executing deconstruction on a text. As Hugh J. Silverman identifies it, the strategy is threefold: the first step is to identify the conceptual opposites that operate within a metaphysical discourse and tactically overturn the traditional hierarchy in the binary opposites. The second is to mark the indecidability of the relation between the two factors in the binary structure. And by doing so, thirdly, a deconstructive reading reveals the limit of a discourse and metaphysical thinking.[\[11\]](#)
- ¶23. The deconstructive turn in Western metaphysics facilitates a turning point in the comparative study between East and West, especially that in Buddhism and Western thought. Pioneering work in the field of Buddhism and deconstruction was done by Robert Magliola whose book *Derrida on the Mend* (1983) marks a serious “beginning” of this comparative study. The title is suggestive of the role of this “field” of study. Is Derrida mending the wall damaged by the metaphysical thinking in the West, or is he mending the wall between the East and the West? [\[12\]](#) The curative image involved in the “field” continues as we can find it in one of recent publications, *Healing Deconstruction* (1996), edited by David Loy. Does deconstruction provide a cure for the Western (and Eastern as well) philosophical tradition? Or is it deconstruction itself that needs healing with the help of Buddhism?

[13] The ambiguity itself might be taken as the nature of this comparative project to which topic I will return shortly.

- ¶24. Similarity between basic Buddhist doctrine and deconstruction is unmistakable as much as the contradiction was so in the case of Buddhism and metaphysical thinking: (1) Both Dependent Co-arising in Buddhism and *différance*/trace in deconstruction provide differential notion; (2) Both problematize the concept of self based on the principle of identity; (3) Both bring attention to the problem of the traditional concept of binary opposites and marks the indecidability in the relation between the two elements in binary opposites.
- ¶25. The majority of works have been done on a comparison between Madhyamika Buddhism and Derridean deconstruction. Nagarjuna's criticism of substantial approach in Buddhism and his logical play has been compared to Derridean deconstruction of traditional metaphysical texts. The concept of non-self in Buddhism has been juxtaposed with Satre's existential self, Merleau-Ponty's concept of visibility and Lacan's subject with a bar. Also, deconstructive approach to language in Ch'an Buddhism was explained in connection with contemporary linguistic theory such as Julia Kristeva's theory of the semiotic and the symbolic and Merleau-Ponty's direct and indirect language.

3. Marking the *Différance*: between Buddhism and Deconstruction

- ¶26. The question of similarities between the Derridean practice of deconstruction and negative theology, if we may consider Buddhism as a sort of negative theology, was presented as early as 1968. During the discussion after Derrida's presentation of his article, "Différance," at the Sorbonne, Brice Parain states: "It [*différance*] is the source of everything and one cannot know it: it is the God of negative theology." [14] Derrida refuses to identify *différance* in the context of negative theology: [15] for negative theology to him is also "an excessive practice of *langue*." [16] The implication is clear. Derrida wants to stay away from any discourse which is based on the principle of identity, while still enabling the situation to be applied to the comparative study of Buddhism and deconstruction. As David Loy puts it:
- ¶27. What is interesting about Buddhism, from a deconstructive point of view, is that it is both onto-theological (therefore what-needs-to-be-deconstructed) and deconstructive (providing a different example of how-to-deconstruct). What is interesting about Derrida's type of deconstruction, from a Buddhist point of view, is that it is logocentric. ...Derrida's approach is still logocentric, for what needs to be deconstructed is not just language but the world we live in and the way we live in it, trapped within a cage of our own making... [17]

- ¶28. Loy's articulation tells much about the position of Buddhism and deconstruction, as they are seen from the perspective of the other. Despite the similarities and shared ideas between the two, there are clear distinctions between them which make this comparative study more meaningful.
- ¶29. One problem of Buddhism as a deconstructive operation arises with the fact that within Buddhist doctrine are encompassed both deconstructive and onto-theological aspects. This dual tendency in Buddhism is clearly reflected in the orientation of the comparative study of Buddhism and deconstruction. As mentioned earlier, the majority of publications and research in this field have dealt with Madhyamika Buddhism whether the research was done in Indian or Chinese contexts. This trend is in turn suggestive of the essentialist nature of other Buddhist schools. For example, the Tathagathabargha theory in Yogacara, or 'the mind is the Buddha' claim in Ch'an tradition have many elements to be read in line with the onto-theological tradition. From the perspective of Derridean deconstruction, such onto-theological tendency cannot be dismissed merely because of the deconstructive operation which runs through other aspects of Buddhism. Derrida has clearly demonstrated this issue in his handling of Heidegger's texts, among others.
- ¶30. This issue of different features within Buddhist tradition brings to our attention the problem of the all-encompassing term, Buddhism. In the course of its twenty-five hundred year history, Buddhism has developed various schools whose emphases sometimes contradict each other. Using the generic term Buddhism without identifying a certain school within it can cause some confusion and even misunderstanding of this project itself.
- ¶31. Another problem is the concept of enlightenment, the very goal of the Buddhist practice. Whether enlightenment is understood in the context of a lineal movement as in the Theravada and gradual schools, or as a sudden enlightenment based on the equation of samsara and nirvana, the concept can still be read within the metaphysical tradition from the deconstructive perspective. In the case of the former, the teleological logic involved in the approach reflects the dualistic tendency along with the concept of the origin and the goal. In the case of the latter, the identification of samsara and nirvana inevitably makes sudden enlightenment a part of an ontological project. Hence, the principle of identity still lingers in both cases.

- ¶32. From the Buddhist perspective, enlightenment is far from being a static entity. It is a differential concept by all means. Ch'an Buddhism especially has made every effort not to make it a static goal, a reified state, which exists separate from the practitioner's reality. The teaching of cultivation-of-no-cultivation is merely one example of such an attempt. It is not so much a problem with the Buddhist teaching itself, Buddhists would argue, as the nature of language which functions on a discrimination-base. Kungan practice in Ch'an Buddhism has been an extreme effort to defy the principle of identity by various methods of reworking language and undoing the damage done by the linguistic system on our mode of thinking.
- ¶33. Hence, from the perspective of Buddhism, deconstructive practice has not been deconstructive enough because of the over-consciousness of its relationship with metaphysical tradition. Deconstruction has remained within the realm of textual analysis, refusing to make a "leap" from theory to practice. According to a Buddhist scholar-practitioner, Derridean deconstruction has "open[ed] up paths that he [Derrida] himself has been unwilling or unable to explore" and these tasks which Derridean deconstruction has been incapable of carrying out can be compensated for by "religious disciplines," especially praxis in Buddhist tradition to balance out theoria of deconstruction.^[18] Whether the deconstructive project has strictly remained within a textual analysis, shutting itself off from the deconstruction of the issues in the "life-worlds," is a debatable issue. And Derrida will argue against the idea of any kind of "leap" whether it be a leap from metaphysics to deconstruction, or from theory to practice. However, such a criticism from a Buddhist point of view can open up a possibility that the Derridean type of deconstruction might want to consider for a self-criticism.
- ¶34. Further, this brings up the issue of genre in the comparative project of Buddhism and deconstruction, which has not yet been seriously discussed. From the beginning, the project was off balanced. By juxtaposing religio-philosophical tradition of Buddhism with philosophy of deconstruction, the project attempts to cross the border of genre as much as that of geographic specifics. However, the demarcation between religion and philosophy has never been clear in Asian tradition and Derridean deconstruction has been a philosophy which defies the very definition of philosophy. Further, more and more scholars begin to address the religious dimension in Derrida's writing, which might provide a new direction in this comparative study between Buddhism and deconstruction.

- ¶35. Finally, the crossing of the genre proposes the potential "utility" of Buddhist tradition and deconstruction to each other. Despite the sophisticated philosophy and handling of language that Buddhism has developed, it has not been efficient in presenting itself in a "logical" manner using modern terminology. The case has been worse in the Ch'an tradition. The result of Buddhism's incapacity to adequately present itself in modern context has a dual result. In regions where Buddhism has been a part of the tradition (i.e., in Asia), to get involved with Buddhism is a part of backward movement.
- ¶36. On the other hand, in regions where Buddhism has been newly introduced (like in the United States), the Buddhist silence has contributed to making itself another mysticism from the Orient. Deconstruction, both in Derridean and other forms, can on one hand be used as a tool to convey the logic of Buddhism in a more efficient manner and facilitate the re-reading of Buddhist doctrine in the modern context. On the other hand, Buddhism, as a tradition which has executed a deconstructive spirit in its own way, can provide a reference point for another possibility in the operation of deconstruction. The comparative study then can be an occasion for "healing deconstruction/Buddhism." The therapeutic approach itself, however, is based on the dualistic vision and sometimes even hierarchical relationship, and such a danger should not be forgotten, if the spirit of the comparative study is to be maintained.

4. Crossing the border

- ¶37. The East-West dialogue is in the end an endeavor to open ourselves up to the possibilities which we fail to see because of the self-closure involved in any kind of discourse. Hence, Maurice Merleau-Ponty once wrote: "Western philosophy can learn from [India and China] to rediscover the relationship to being and initial option which gave it birth, and to estimate the possibilities we have shut ourselves off from in becoming 'Westerners', and perhaps reopen them."^[19] The cultural-philosophical orientation in our time seems to provide a better condition in which to carry out such a self-critical project of the comparative study. The opening-up of one's mode of thinking is not an action that can be taken place with a teleological phase of our philosophy. Instead, it will remain as a question-- an interrogative mode which Merleau-Ponty identifies as a philosophical mode beyond the metaphysics and which Lyotard takes as a spirit of the postmodern.

END NOTES

1. This essay is a summary version of my Introduction to Jin Y. Park, ed. *Buddhisms and Deconstructions* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004 forthcoming.)
2. Although a fragment of Buddhism has been known to Europeans for long, it was not until the nineteenth century that Buddhism in Pali and Sanskrit was studied in any serious manner. J. W. de Jong divides the study of Buddhism in Europe in the following manner: (1) The Early period (300 BC.- 1877): no research Buddhism was published before 1825. During the period of 1826-1877 initiative works were done, and main figure was Eugene Bernouf; (2) The Middle Period (1877-1942): The first volume of Jataka book was published by Fausbøll, and 1881 The Pali Text Society was founded by W. Rhys Davids. (3) The Recent Period (1943-1973): Research on Mahayana Buddhism began to gain momentum. (See, J. W. de Jong, *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America*, Tokyo: Kensei Publishing Co (1997)).
3. See, for example, Guy R. Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1968), for the evaluation of Buddhism by the first generation European Buddhologies, such as Saint Hillaire, Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852) or his student Marx Müller (1823-1900). Also see, W Peiris, *The Western Contribution to Buddhism*, Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass (1973).
4. Hegel gave four lectures on the philosophy of religion in 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831. Each time he made a drastic revision in his theory on the evolution of world religions. However his position on Buddhism did not change much. In the lecture of 1821, he did not include any Asian religions. In the lectures of 1824 and 1827, Buddhism is categorized as the religion of The Being-within-Self and in 1831 lecture, he identifies it as the religion of annihilation. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, P. C. Hodgson (Ed.), translated by R Brown J Stewart and H Harris, Berkeley: University of California Press (1995).
5. *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus: The Paradigmatic Individuals*, translated by Karl Jaspers and Ralph Manheim, San Diego: A Harvest Book (1990), 40.
6. Thich Nhat Hanh, *The Heart of Understanding: Commentaris on the Prajnaparamita heart S*, Berkeley: Parallax Press (1998), 3.

7. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage Books (1973), 387. Foucault writes: “man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”
8. Jean Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Explained*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1993), 18.
9. “Différence,” in Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, translated by David Allison, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1973), 130.
10. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, translated by Wade Baskin, New York: MacGraw-Hill (1959), 120.
11. Hugh J. Silverman, *Inscription: Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction*, New York and London: Routledge (1994), 64-67.
12. In Magliola’s own words: ”the phrase ‘on the mend’ [in Derrida on the Mend] keeps its ambiguity: differentialism is astride the mend in organic unity in order to unravel it, but differentialism is also at the work of mending Derrida.“ Robert Magliola, *Postmodernism on the Brim: A Differentialist Manifesto*, *Proceedings of the Symposium on Postmodernism, Cerisy-la-Salle, France: Krisis*, 3 1985, 91-111, 91.
13. David Loy writes in the Introduction to the volume: ”...the title Healing Deconstruction is intentionally ambiguous. On the one side, it emphasizes the healing possibilities of deconstruction in a field where the deconstructive turn has too often been understood reductively...On the other side, the title also refers to the potential healing power of this dialogue for deconstruction itself, whose critique of logocentrism has led to a rupture within contemporary thought.“ *Healing Deconstruction: Postmodern thought in Buddhism and Christianit* D. Loy (Ed.), Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press (1996), 2.
14. *Derrida and Différance* D. Wood and R. Bernasconi (Eds.), Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press (1998), 84.
15. I am here brining up the term ”negative theology“ in connection with Buddhism; but obviously to some scholars, Derrida is more in the Jewish tradition than ”European, Greek and Christian“ tradition of negative theology. See John D. Caputo, *The Prayer and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (1997).

- [16.](#) [Derrida and Différance](#) D. Wood and R. Bernasconi (Eds.), Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press (1998), 85 (emphasis original).
- [17.](#) David R. Loy, [The Deconstruction of Buddhism](#) in H. Coward and T. Foshay (Eds.), *Derrida and Negative Theology* Albany, NY: SUNY Press (1992), 227.
- [18.](#) [Healing Deconstruction: Postmodern Thought in Buddhism and Christianity](#) D. Loy (Ed.), Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press (1996), 2.
- [19.](#) “Everywhere and Nowhere“ in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, translated by Richard McCleary, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1964), 139.

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