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Kant and the Post-Kantian Idealism: A Philosophical Approach beyond Substantialism or Non-Substantialism?

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Introduction

- ¶1. When Kant entered the stage in the middle of the seventeenth century, three major topics within the field of metaphysics were regarded as the focus area of philosophical inquiry and thought development: Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. Concerning the psychological idea of an unconditioned ground within us, the human soul was considered to be an ever lasting, self-determining substance within us. The cosmological idea of a sufficient ground of all existing beings led to different concepts of smallest entities (Atomism) or of unconditioned principles within or outside of us. The theological idea of a supreme being as the ultimate reality led to a concept of God as an independent substantial unity. Thus the substantialistic view was prevailing in all three fields of former 'metaphysica specialis', in Psychology, Cosmology and Theology.
- ¶2. Concerning the concept of substance within the development of Western philosophy, Kant's critical epistemology may be regarded as a turning point. Mediating between the rationalistic ontology of the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy and the arising scepticism of Hume and Locke Kant's critical epistemology sought the middle ground: Empiricism and Rationalism, substantialism and non-substantialism, should no longer be regarded as excluding alternatives; both concepts should be integrated within one philosophical system.

- ¶3. I hold that both philosophical claims: the concept of substantialism and its contradicting counterpart, the non-substantialistic view, are not just a specificity of Western thought development. Concerning the major topics of the grounding principles of reality (God, world and soul), the domain of philosophical inquiry was akin to the thought development within different non-European philosophical traditions: Within Hindu Advaita-Vedanta philosophy for example, human knowledge should reach the unconditioned self (Atman) as the ultimate ground within us. Buddhist philosophers focused critically on this "miraculous entity" of an internal substantial ground. Their argument was: our "self" should not be regarded as a unifying metaphysical entity; the only essences we might be aware of are the ever changing patterns of our historically and empirically bounded self-an ever floating, never resting appearance in space and time. Identity should be found only within the flux of restless time-sequences.
- ¶4. Eastern philosophies are often characterised as non-substantialistic, whereas the development of philosophical thought in the West is often described as substantialistic. According to our view this characteristic is misleading: we rather find both positions in both traditions.
- ¶5. I will hold that Kant and the post-Kantian Idealists were mainly interested in synthesizing the extremes. In their view, the rationalist approach failed to understand the concept of becoming and thus failed to understand the contingency and relativity of the empirical world, while its empiricist counterpart failed to explain the concept of identity.^[1] According to Kant and the post-Kantians, relativity and change can only be understood with reference to a transcendental unity within us, called "I" or the "self."^[2] But this transcendental unity of apperception should not be misunderstood as a substantial entity with attributes like permanence, indivisibility, or existence over time; it should rather be understood as a function of our epistemic activities. This self-constituting unity of apperception leads furthermore to a concept of activity, prior to all concepts of being.^[3] All we perceive or judge is due to our conceptual activities: no perception without the activity of synthesis; no synthesis without the activity of apprehending the manifold sensations given to our intuition; no apprehension without successively connecting the manifold sensations to distinguishable units of space and time.^[4] By this we may already grasp the later Hegelian idea of the first principle: the first principle in the system of "Logic" should not be understood as a substance but as a subject, as the principle of activity and not as an isolated independent entity.^[5]

- ¶6. I will begin my reconstructive analysis with Kant's systematic approach. The question is: in what respect does he try to bridge the gap between substantialism and non-substantialism? I will continue with Fichte's concept of the absolute spontaneity of the originating "I." This will be followed by an examination of Schelling's radical idea of activity, which paved the way for Hegel's idea of the originating substance as pure activity. I will end with a few remarks on Hegel's attempt to overcome the substantialistic approach within the field of ontology and metaphysics. Since German Idealism often counts as an example of a substantialistic metaphysics, I will question the validity of this judgement by analysing the concepts of substance and being in Kant and post-Kantian German Idealism.
- ¶7. Kant's transcendental epistemology was the point of reference and departure for Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Since Kant gave preference to practical reason, the concept of activity was central not only for the architecture of his philosophical system, but also as the starting point of the post-Kantian philosophical debate.

I. Kant's Mediating Approach

- ¶8. Kant regarded his *Critique of Pure Reason* as an invitation, an architectonic plan or topology to a future metaphysical concept that would answer these major questions for a possible metaphysics.^[6] In accordance with the spirit of the ancient Delphic inscription "*gnoti seauton*", his purpose was to find an explanation of our cognitive activities.^[7] Thus the idea of purifying our concept of reason and rationality was less concerned with the objects of our scrutiny than with the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge.^[8]
- ¶9. Concerning the category of substance, Kant came to the following results:
- a) In his *Critique of Pure Reason* the concept of 'Substance' does not represent any independent object, either as an appearance or as a thing in itself;
 - b) Substance is furthermore interpreted as an *a priori*-subjective form of understanding which organises our sense-perceptions according to possible objects of thinking.^[9] Thus the concept of substance as an *a priori* category of our understanding seems to be unavoidable to grasp an object-a something as something. As a mere subjective form of understanding it does not anticipate any specific ontology. Concerning the empirical world it anticipates the idea of independent, separable objects. Concerning the idea of the world as a whole Kant refuses any substantialistic view; his effort to investigate the limits and possibilities of our reason was due to the question of whether or not we can interpret the essence of being in analogy to the world of empirical objects in space and time, and his answer was: We will inevitably face antinomies,

paradoxes, and contradictions if we interpret the supra-natural world in a substantialistic way; i.e. in analogy to given objects in space and time.

c) The category of substance can only be used by reference to a given object in space and time. Within this ever-changing field of empirical reality, all our knowledge remains bounded within these limits of space and time, for it is relative to our goals and purposes. Thus, for Kant, scepticism and relativism seemed to be the only suitable attitude towards the field of uncertainty and contingency, towards the field of our ever-changing perspectives and reasons of our empirical world.[\[10\]](#)

- ¶10. The concept of field-being, as well as the contemporary development of quantum field theory within micro-physics, draws the most radical consequence. The thesis is this: we enter a sphere of non-objectivity wherein objects lose their identity when regarded as fields of energy in a micro-physical world. There is no independent observer observing independent, separable substances. Thus the identity of an object may turn out to be an illusion.
- ¶11. Kant asked, how is it possible to identify separable objects within space and time? For him, to identify an object is a result of our conceptual activities; we separate objects within space and time by intuiting, conceptualising, naming, or relating them. [\[11\]](#) Otherwise we would be unable to distinguish between different objects. Therefore, even by naming them, we presuppose the concept of identity.[\[12\]](#) This means we regard them as units consisting of different yet distinguishable properties.
- ¶12. From this observation Kant comes to the conclusion that continuity over time and changing within time must not contradict. On the contrary, in order to mark any change we must identify a substratum which remains constantly over time.[\[13\]](#) Therefore Kant holds that in order to identify a thing as such we presuppose a substratum as the basis of all properties, which remains constant while all its properties change. On an ontological level Kant would say we need or presuppose the concept of a substance in order to bring order into our different sense-perceptions.[\[14\]](#) Even though we might not be able to justify our talk of stable objects within the horizon of a quantum field-theory, on a macro-level of our daily-life experiences we cannot do without the unifying idea of separable objects. Therefore we have to face the paradoxical implications by abandoning the concept of substance: either we presuppose constantly observable objects in space and time, and by doing so contradict the results of the quantum field theory, or we deny the existence of properly distinguishable units, and then fail to explain their existence on a macro-physical level or in our daily-life orientation.

II. The Non-Substantialistic Turn within Kant's Transcendental Philosophy: Primacy of a Theory of Activity

- ¶13. According to his view on the category of substance, Kant came to the following three conclusions concerning the major fields of the former 'metaphysica specialis': First, the idea of our self should no longer be regarded as a permanent substance within us, to which can be attributed qualities like indivisibility, unity, immortality etc.[\[15\]](#) Second, the world of appearing objects-the world of external nature-should no longer be described in substantial terms since there are no stable constant elements within stable causal relations. We can only say: if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another-a series which is itself unconditioned-must be likewise given.[\[16\]](#) And third, the universe should be regarded as a whole. Even though we will not stop looking for the unconditioned ground of reality, in which all parts are interconnected, we will never reach a well-defined entity or substance like the Substance of Spinoza's highest being. The concept of the whole can only be achieved approximately by our notions.[\[17\]](#) This is the sceptical dimension in Kant, leading to a non-substantialist turn within Western Philosophy.[\[18\]](#) Different philosophical positions followed this path: Naturalism, Existentialism, Empiricism, System Theory, Critical Rationalism, and Radical Constructivism. For most of them the most striking points in Kant are his dedication to the phenomenal world, and his attempt to lay the ground for a new concept of reality and pave the way to a new understanding of the natural sciences.
- ¶14. Kant's sceptical approach gave credit to the contingency of our empirical world. For the sake of our free will, the sphere of our practical reason, we have to maintain the idea of an unconditioned ground. Since the idea of a moral world depends on the principle of self-determination-of self-creation-we presuppose freedom as the unconditioned condition within the field of activity-as an unconditioned ground of all activities. Activity was regarded as the basic force of all reality.[\[19\]](#)
- ¶15. ...[I]t is not only where human reason exhibits genuine causality, and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), namely in the moral sphere, but also in regard to nature itself, that Plato rightly assumed we have to discern clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement of the cosmos-presumably therefore the entire natural world-clearly show that they are possible only according to ideas ... But only the totality of things in their interconnection as constituting the universe, is completely adequate to the idea.[\[20\]](#)

- ¶16. Kant's program of a future metaphysical concept contains two parts: (a) a metaphysics of nature, and (b) a metaphysics of morality. Both spheres are united within his third Critique, the Critique of Pure Judgement. In his third Critique, Kant started out by presenting the rules of judgment of the beautiful and the sublime, and finally, of our teleological judgment. According to Kant, the idea of the whole universe can only be completed in a concept of teleology because only a teleological view includes the sensual, mechanical, organic, and moral dimension of our existence. According to this teleological conception, the universe is not only to be explained in terms of material, formal, or mechanical reasons, but also depends for its intelligibility on the purposiveness of the organic world-that is, with reference to the interrelating natural and moral dimensions. But in order to avoid Spinoza's idea of an all-encompassing determinism, Kant gave preference to the moral dimension-to the domain of practical reason: the world should be regarded as built by means of our actions. Action prevails over all existing beings, since practical reason depends on the idea of a final cause: the idea of good or bad within the limits of an all-determining, ever-changing nature.
- ¶17. Thus teleological judgment built the core of Kant's enterprise; only by reference to the transcendental idea of the purposiveness of a teleologically defined process is the interconnection among all different spheres possible: natural and moral purposes, mechanical and teleological reasons.[\[21\]](#) Nature, on the one hand, cannot be described in mere mechanical terms as a mere "topological necessity;" activity, on the other hand, can only be understood within the framework of all-encompassing nature. Only within his Third Critique does Kant find the principles which lead far beyond the Newtonian mechanistic world-view: Kant's "Ethico-theology" gives credit to the primacy of action and free will for human nature. Only by virtue of our social and moral activities as a whole might the world achieve its final goal- the creation of a world of freedom and social justice.[\[22\]](#)
- ¶18. Thus Spinoza's concept of an absolute substance is radically transformed into a non-substantialistic view of the phenomenal world. Kant's ideal of an all-encompassing reality should no longer be identified with a permanent absolute substance, but with a self-determining being, guided by our free actions. All purposiveness culminates in our moral activities; only by our free will may a harmonious state between body and mind, nature and spirit, mechanism, and teleology be achieved. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel followed this path even more radically, by specifying the non-substantialistic view.
- ¶19. We face three types of critique: Fichte's critique of the thing in itself as a relic of a substantialistic approach in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; Schelling's attempt to radicalize the principle of activity; and Hegel's relational approach beyond all dichotomies.

III. Post-Kantian Idealism: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel

a) J. G. Fichte: Substance as Pure Activity:

- ¶20. In his first writings, the first editions of his "doctrine of science" (Wissenschaftslehre, dating back to 1794 and 1797), Fichte regarded the spontaneity of the Absolute I or Self as the grounding principle, but, after 1800, he started to de-emphasize this principle: first, in his Doctrine of Science of 1801, when he replaced the Absolute I with Absolute Knowledge, and second, still more radically when he deconstructed Absolute Knowledge by the All-encompassing Light as the new unifying principle. Only by "Self-destructing the thinking I"[23] and negating self-knowledge does the grounding fundament which unifies thinking and being arise.
- ¶21. Following this path, Fichte radicalized his critique of Spinoza's substance. He declared that the first principle should neither be an absolute substance nor an absolute I; it should rather lead beyond all conceptual approaches, negating all predicates attributed to any object or any subjective activity. Thus by being aware of our own limits we will discover the enlightening origin of the primary being as the source of all thoughts. God, or the pure light, stays inconceivably hidden to all our notions. Thus we conceive only His inconceivability. It is only by evidence, by intellectual intuition, that we might find access to the highest principle as the exponent and correlate of the pure light.[24] Not only did the late Fichte radicalize the principle of self-production, he also tried to deconstruct the idea of a supreme being as a substantial entity. Concerning Fichte's concept of an Absolute Idealism, Schelling tries to point out the differences.

b) J.W.F. Schelling: The Ontological Shift, Philosophy of Nature and System of Identity

- ¶22. Schelling's objections against the Subjective Idealism of Fichte's Philosophy are the starting point of what we might call "Objective Idealism." Later on we will see that Hegel puts a third variation of Idealism on stage: his Idealism is meant to operate beyond both sides, composed beyond the realm of subjectivity and objectivity. Schelling started out with a similar idea: the highest principle should be located within the point of indifference-or trans-difference-between both spheres, not being reducible to one of the two sides.[25] Schelling's path, coming from Fichte, led directly to a concept of objectivity without substantializing either the objective or the subjective sphere.[26]

- ¶23. Starting with a Philosophy of Nature, Schelling's philosophy emerged completely independently from Fichte. His starting point was no longer the finite or human I, but the infinite subject or activity, namely (1) the Absolute Subject, because only the idea of an Absolute Subject is immediately certain; and (2) the Infinite Subject, because it can never be regarded as an object (as *bedingt*), as it was the case for Spinoza. What we face is the idea of a universal process, initiated by a self-positing active principle. [27] In this respect Schelling follows the Aristotelian line: we do not have to explain pure being, but we rather have to understand its striving principles.
- ¶24. If we begin with a subjective principle, Schelling explicitly says in his "System des transzendentalen Idealismus," it is inadequate for the principle to stay an object, a mere substance. It is furthermore necessary that, once the movement has begun, it necessarily progresses by our activities.
- ¶25. The emerging view that we see within the philosophical frame of Schelling's position is the new foundation for our consciousness; our consciousness or self should no longer be regarded as a self-dependent entity. Schelling proclaims the domain of unconsciousness as the source of all consciousness. [28] His idea was that only by our unconsciousness can we find true access to the external world. Only within this state of growing or becoming conscious did we come to achieve our identity. Thus, we are preconscious, or unconscious. This idea was the seminal thought inaugurating the tradition of Nietzsche's existentialism, Heidegger's fundamental-ontology, and Freud's psycho-analysis; a new foundation of self-consciousness was born.
- ¶26. Thus our activity should be none other than just the work of the coming-to-itself, of the process by which the self becomes conscious of itself. As a consequence of this historical or "genetic view," Schelling tried to develop a history of self-consciousness. As soon as self-consciousness had become an object in itself it found itself not as a simple "I" but as subject and object at the same time; it was now "for itself." Explaining why self-consciousness had to be established, Schelling declared that we had to overcome the contingency related to it. The moments of this successive overcoming should be identical with the development of nature. This process should successively enter different stages (different *Potenzen*), until the "I," or the "self," would lose all its limitations and enter the sphere of freedom. Only now the self or I "really had itself, or was for itself" [29]: pure freedom or pure activity. With the idea of pure activity theoretical philosophy ended and practical philosophy could now begin.

- ¶27. For Schelling's historical view the whole of philosophy should evolve as a history of self-consciousness similar to the development of different epochs in history. The first epoch reached from the original sensation until productive intuition up to the sphere of the philosophising "I." In the result the objective "I" should be identical with the philosophising "I"; no difference should be possible any more between the objective and the subjective "I." Within a Socratic process, the objective "I" should overcome its limitations by analysing the unknown presuppositions within the objective "I" up to the point where the philosophising "I" can find a complete knowledge of itself. By looking at this process we face the situation when Hegel entered the stage.[\[30\]](#)

c) Hegel: The Absolute Spirit as a Relational Principle

- ¶28. How did Hegel define the universal development as process initiated and put on stage by the principle of activity? First let us have a look at the main idea of Hegel's Philosophy of the Absolute Spirit, elaborated in his *Science of Logic* of 1812 and 1816. Like Schelling he claimed that the first principle must be a moving principle, a principle of activity and not a mere absolute substance as it is elaborated in the Ethics of Spinoza.[\[31\]](#) The becoming of the whole universe should be interpreted as the self-development and the self-achievement of the highest principle in itself. The cosmological development is just His own way coming up to himself and returning into its own, as Plotinus' God does in the Neo-platonic version of his cosmology.
- ¶29. Thus Hegel's *Science of Logic* in the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* of 1830 is divided into three parts: first, Hegel gives the structure of the *Science of Logic* as the anticipating horizon of all different spheres of reality; second, the creation of the world as an act of pure freedom starts with the creation of the spacio-temporal cosmos, elaborated within the philosophy of nature; and third, mechanical movement as the extensional dimension successively leads to the concept of singularities with their chemical properties, up to organic physics as the preconditioned ground for the development of human nature. Once human nature enters the stage, in the third chapter, philosophy of the spirit starts. First, within the field of the subjective spirit in the horizon of Anthropology, Phenomenology of the Spirit, consciousness, and spirit itself are presented. The domain of the spirit itself is divided into the theoretical and the practical spirit before it is transferred to the field of the objective spirit. Within the domain of the objective spirit, law, morality and the unity of both lead to a division of family, society, and state.

- ¶30. But even this field of the objective spirit does not complete the genetic development of all categories. The totality of a completely determined reality is not the last sphere in Hegel's Science of Logic. The striving principle of all movement, which leads to a successive overcoming of all undeveloped stages, is the principle of negation. As Spinoza also noted, all determination is a result of negation. Hegel's Logic describes the Idea as the main principle of action in the different steps of its negativity, and as the dialectical movement of the absolute spirit. Hence Hegel's first category can neither be pure being nor pure nothing.[\[32\]](#) It is rather the concept of becoming. With this category Hegel picks up the universal Logic of becoming, as in the Pre-Socratic position of Heraclitus. Like Plato, Hegel overcame the idea of an undetermined pure being with reference to its Pre-Socratic counterpart, that is, to Heraclitus. For Hegel, as we saw earlier in Schelling's philosophy, the final cause should not be identified either with our subjective concepts or with the teleological process in nature or society. The final cause of the whole development rather leads far beyond these dichotomic dimensions, unifying the potentiality of action with the process itself. The whole process is determined by a spiritual purposiveness, integrating subjectivity within its causes—namely the material, formal, efficient and final causes.
- ¶31. Thus, starting with the unconscious blind natural movement—like Schelling's unconscious nature—and leading to the highest spirit, the whole evolutionary process has to be regarded as one single process with different steps of its fulfilment or completion. The highest principle, the absolute spirit, transcends even the objective and the subjective world, being not identifiable with the human or natural sphere nor being specifically qualified as a principle of their interaction. We might find Him in nature, but He is not identical with nature. We might find Him in our actions and thoughts, but He is not identical with any of our worships or activities.
- ¶32. Now the whole development of all Hegel's thought comes to its final end. Being and Idea now are the same; the concept of being has come into its own, becoming pure self-consciousness, and being and self-consciousness now are identical. And this is the point that Hegel wanted to achieve: being should not be understood in the sense of unconscious pure external being, but should include the spiritual domain as its true origin—as its moving principle. Spirit comes to terms with this task because it is the integrating sphere of all different causes: it is a unity of matter and mind, it is self-originating, and it is purposiveness in that it integrates its own final causes.[\[33\]](#)
- ¶33. In this way post-Kantian philosophy inaugurated a philosophical system in the new shape of a metaphysics of freedom. Freedom and activity are seen as the moving ground, but never independent from necessity. Freedom is, rather, bound to the necessity of the development of all spheres of being. Being is not fulfilled at the beginning; it becomes fulfilled when it returns into its own nature after the unfolding of all its determinations.

- ¶34. As in the concept of "Field-Being," developed by Lik Kuen Tong, the idea is that the moment we enter the matrix of conditionality or the domain of the topological necessity, we are limited in space and time, bound to our needs and relations. Pure potentiality reveals itself only within the different regions or forms of activity, a process which Hegel names 'diremption'. Within the 'Undivided Whole,' or the Oneness of the Field-Being, all spheres are interconnected; none of them may be regarded as an independent entity. Hegel shares this idea of the universal relatedness of all spheres of reality.
- ¶35. Since we cannot objectify this Oneness or the "whole" in its pure potentiality, it can as well be named "Pure Nothingness". Like Hegel's notion of pure being, Pure Nothingness can be regarded as the pre-predicative ground, as the undivided whole beyond all separation, beyond all diremption into its different spheres. Thus its topos is beyond all division in subject and object, for "pure being" and "pure nothingness" for Hegel turn out to be the same: both operate beyond all objectifications, and beyond all dichotomies. In the search for a mediating ground between Parmenides and Heraclitus-between East and West-Hegel tried to bridge the gap between two major traditions of philosophical thinking: the Eastern concept of pure nothingness and the Western emphasis on pure being.

END NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1976), A 426 B 454 ff.
2. *ibid.*, B 132 ff.
3. *ibid.*, B 132 ff.
4. *ibid.*, A 99 ff.
5. Georg W. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Frankfurt/M.: SuhrKamp Verlag (1972), 248 ff.
6. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1976), A VII ff.
7. *ibid.*, A XI ff.
8. *ibid.*, A 9 B 13; B 19.

- [9.](#) [ibid.](#), A 80 B 106.
- [10.](#) [ibid.](#), B 3.
- [11.](#) [ibid.](#), A 99 ff.
- [12.](#) [ibid.](#), A 103 ff.
- [13.](#) [ibid.](#), A 172 B 225 ff. This substratum can only be named as an `X`, a point of reference to our thoughts - without any further attributes. All we can know about this substratum is linked to its appearances in space and time. The underlying thing in itself remains hidden behind these spacio-temporal appearances. If we would not presuppose an underlying thing in itself, all existing beings would depend on spacio-temporal properties. But if nothing except spacio-temporal objects would exist, the ideas of freedom and God would be lost.
- [14.](#) [ibid.](#), A 172 B 225 ff.
- [15.](#) [ibid.](#), A 341 B 399 ff.
- [16.](#) [ibid.](#), A 444 B 472.
- [17.](#) [ibid.](#), A 444 B 472A 663 B 691 ff.; A 612 B 640 ff.
- [18.](#) Claudia Bickmann, [Auf dem Wege zu einer Metaphysik der Freiheit: Kants Idee der Vollendung der Kopernikanischen Wende im Experiment der Vernunft mit sich selbst](#), *Kant Studien*, (3) 1995, 321-330.
- [19.](#) Immanuel Kant, [Kritik der Urteilkraft](#), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (1976), A 406 B 411 ff.
- [20.](#) Immanuel Kant, [Kritik der reinen Vernunft](#), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1976), A 317 B 374.
- [21.](#) Immanuel Kant, [Kritik der Urteilkraft](#), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (1976), A 422 B 427.

- [22.](#) Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag (1976), A 804 B 832 ff.
- [23.](#) Johann G. Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre von 1813, Fichtes Werke, hg. v. H.I. Fichte*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (1971), 148.
- [24.](#) *ibid.*, 148.
- [25.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *Mythologie* in K. F. Schelling (Ed.), *Werke* Stuttgart: Cotta (1861), 328, 345, 348, 365.
- [26.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *Darstellung meines Systems von 1801* in K. F. Schelling (Ed.), *Werke* Stuttgart: Cotta (1861).
- [27.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen (1796/1797)* in K. F. Schelling (Ed.), *Werke* Stuttgart: Cotta (1861).
- [28.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *Andere Deduktion der Principien der positiven Philosophie* in K. F. Schelling (Ed.), *Werke* Stuttgart: Cotta (1861), 337-536, 353 ff.
- [29.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press (1994).
- [30.](#) *ibid.*
- [31.](#) Georg W. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, Frankfurt/M.: SuhrKamp Verlag (1972), 248 ff.
- [32.](#) *ibid.*, 82 ff.
- [33.](#) Friedrich W. Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press (1994).

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